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AbstrAct 
The Nordic countries are renowned for their high level of unionization and collective bargaining. 
However, globalization, Europeanization, and an increasing individualization are often pictured 
as factors suppressing collective regulation. In this article, we look at the developments in the 
regulation of wages and working conditions from a macro perspective by combing two large cross-
sectional surveys into a longitudinal study with point of departure in the Danish case.  We find 
that collective bargaining coverage continues to stand surprisingly strong, both in terms of being 
very widespread and in employee awareness, but Danish wage and salary earners also have an 
interest in extra support in the form of generalization and/or a politically regulated minimum wage. 
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danish Labor Market regulation: something Particular  
and Particularly threatened?
In Denmark—as in the other Nordic countries—there are lengthy traditions for col-lective regulations covering practically the entire labor market. Collective agreements define collective rights as opposed to individual rights, as in most other European and 
Anglo-American systems. Collective awareness and collective regulations count where 
collective agreement coverage exists. But are we approaching the end of the era of col-
lective regulation? This would suggest many discussions, individualization theses (Beck 
et al., 1994; Atkinson, 2007; Berger & Hitzler, 2010), new theoretical lenses like employ-
ment relations (Lewis et al., 2003, Kaufmann, 2004; Wilkinson et al., 2014), or theo-
ries with point of departure in contemporary comparative political economy (Gautié 
& Schmitt, 2010; Stone & Arthurs, 2013; Streeck, 2014). However, the Nordic coun-
tries are, on the other hand, often described as an outlier by displaying a high degree 
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of institutional stability in the changing world of work in spite of liberalization—and 
deregulation processes caused by an increasing international competition, globalization, 
and Europeanization (Thelen, 2009, 2014; Refslund & Sørensen, 2016). 
The institutional stability is often linked to a high degree of collective bargaining 
and collective representativity among both employers (in employer associations) and 
employee. Especially strong labor movements and social democratic parties and cross-
class cooperation have traditionally been identified as important factors in this process 
(Korpi, 1989). This mirrors a close connection between the labor market system and 
the welfare system. Strategic choice theories often miss this point (Kochan et al., 1984; 
Poole, 1986; Sisson, 1987). Collective bargaining coverage and employee perception and 
attitudes toward collective institutions are good indicators on institutional stability or 
transformation. Hence, in this article, we investigate developments in the regulation of 
wages and working conditions seen from an employee perspective. The research ques-
tions guiding our investigation are:
•    How has the collective bargaining coverage developed from 2002 to 2014 seen in 
relation to other forms of regulation?
•    How do employees perceive labor market regulation? Is support for collective agree-
ments still to be found or do employees now prefer other forms of regulation on the 
labor market? 
The data used are based on two large Danish cross-sectional studies from 2002 and 
2014 combined into a longitudinal design. The survey data allow us to survey the devel-
opment in the collective bargaining coverage and at the same time investigate employee’s 
preferences and attitudes toward different forms of labor market regulation. The article 
begins with methodological considerations linked to the study of labor market regula-
tion from a macro-perspective, including the presentation of the data material upon 
which the analysis in hand is based. This is followed by an expanded theoretical expla-
nation of the regulatory forms existing in the Danish labor market and the forces driving 
the regulation of wages and working conditions. The empirical analysis is then presented 
on the background of survey data. The article is rounded off with some concluding 
remarks by returning to the two research questions presented above.
How is Labor Market regulation to be Investigated 
Methodologically? 
The study of labor market regulation from a macro-perspective involves burdensome 
amounts of data, first and foremost because there are no central registers covering the 
collective bargaining agreements. Employer associations in Denmark do have statistics 
regarding their own members, but are left to speculate when it comes to unorganized 
employers (DA, 2015). One is left to try to get a lay of the land via representative sur-
vey or cross-sectional data (Scheuer, 1996, 1997). So, at the moment, there is no strong 
alternative to survey research when you want to have factual information as to the dis-
tribution and prevalence of people’s experiences, preferences, assessments, and opinions 
(Weisberg, 2005, 2008). This is also the case regarding collective bargaining coverage. 
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The design of surveys will have to take notice of some weaknesses as well, but you find no 
other instrument that more precisely will give answers to questions about a population, 
taking enough members of respondents to be able to generalize to the larger population 
of wage earners and trying to minimize nonresponse from people included in the sample. 
This article draws on the so-called APL studies1, which have been carried out since 
1992 by CARMA2 (see Bild et al., 1993, 2007; Lassen et al., 2005; Caraker et al., 2014, 
2015). The surveys have had these sample sizes: In 2002, 6000 persons were included; 
2327 answered, giving a response rate of no less than 53.6. In 2014, 7047 persons 
were given a questionnaire that could be answered by post or by online survey (Evans 
& Mathur, 2005), and 2831 full answers were recorded. The response rate reached 
40.2%. However, no serious bias in the material was discovered. The ways of general-
izing results to the full population of Danish wage earners can be trusted.
By combining the two extensive cross-sectional studies from 2002 and 2014 (APL II 
and APL III) in a single longitudinal study, we are able to analyze employee responses in 
relation to experiences, values, and opinions regarding the regulation of wages/salaries 
and working conditions. This is made possible by the fact that the APL studies from 
2002 and 2014 include a number of identical questions and response categories. As 
both studies are reasonably representative for the total active labor market force with 
respect to organizational factors, age, gender, and so forth, it is possible to compare the 
main areas (e.g., LO, FTF, AC, Lederne)3 and changes over time (Donsbach & Trau-
gott, 2008).4 The same applies at the sector level. This creates unique opportunities for 
analysis—also internationally. However, it is important to stress that statistical analyses 
of the different data sets can discover strong correlations, but these do not account 
for determinants of opinion differences. This is a theoretical task. But the longitudinal 
perspective gives us the opportunity to examine differences between groups of people, 
including both backgrounds and attitudes, and changes over time. We have done exten-
sive examinations of connections of the 2002 and 2014 results and distributions and 
statistical tests have been performed all the way through. 
The survey method is thus appropriate in relation to outlining a current image of 
the collective agreement coverage (the perceived, actual conditions); at the same time, 
the method makes it possible to uncover employee assessments and attitudes (opinion 
questions) to labor market regulation. The survey method is not infallible, however, also 
with respect to the study of labor market regulation. First, previous studies have revealed 
that many employees are not fully aware of the extent to which they are covered by a col-
lective agreement or not, nor what a collective agreement actually means for their remu-
neration and working conditions (see Scheuer & Madsen, 2000, 2002). However, we are 
able to add certain control questions enabling us to test the reliability of the collective 
bargaining coverage. This inconsistency test shows only a small percentage of the answers 
given in the survey regarding the collective bargaining coverage as questionable (below 2 
pct.) (Caraker et al., 2015). Similar findings are found in previous studies (Scheuer, 2000).
In general, surveys also have a limitation in measuring individual opinions. Under 
real-world conditions, opinions are produced as part of collective learning processes. 
Here, focus group interviews might have been an alternative. As another kind of check 
and explanation in depth, we have conducted a number of individual interviews after 
the survey data have been collected and analyzed. In 2015-2016, 53 individual inter-
views have been made with respondents of the survey who have indicated that they 
were willing to participate in such interviews. The same procedure was used in 1992 and 
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2002. Thus, we have another kind of validation of results by the help of the qualitative 
interviews and a further deepening of our understanding of possible explanatory links 
in the material. In this article, we do not use the qualitative interviews directly, as the 
2015–2016 results will be published at the beginning of 2017 only.
But the survey method is obviously advantageous, however, as it provides a repre-
sentative and comprehensive picture of the labor market, which in turn makes it possible 
to draw comparisons between technical and professional areas, sectors and not least 
over time. In the empirical investigations below, we have divided employees according 
to their professional and technical backgrounds divided on the main organization level 
or lack thereof.
the regulation of Labor Markets and the danish case
How is the regulation of the labor market to be understood analytically and operation-
ally? In terms of content, this is about identifying how the labor market functions as 
order-created processes and structures (Emerson, 1988). We are talking about the regu-
lation of the labor market, where collective steps are taken to standardize behavior and/
or set the institutional framework to this end. Regulation can therefore be defined as 
a causal relationship between actors who are acting within an institutional framework 
and which can create negotiated order (Jørgensen, 2014). 
In his seminal work Industrial Relations System, American economist John T. Dunlop 
(1958) describes how every ‘industrial relations system’ produces an ‘outcome’ consist-
ing of a ‘web of rules’ determining and regulating wages and working conditions. ‘The 
outcome’ depends on a number of issues between employers, employees, and the state. 
The regulation of wages and working conditions thus takes place in a balance between 
the free capital and market forces, national and international legislation, and not least 
individual and collective agreements between the social partners. This makes for a rather 
complicated ‘web of rules’ comprising the regulation of wages and working conditions 
in the labor ‘market’. Instead of pure market solutions, where price and volume are the 
only considerations, there is talk of a multiplicity of technical, political, and normative 
regulations. Today, however, the understanding must be changed and expanded. It is too 
narrow and one-dimensional with only three actors, homestatic system propositions, and 
rule-making institutions (Flanders, 1965; Clegg, 1983). It is necessary to operate with a 
more fluid determination of the actor system. The number of actors seeking and obtain-
ing influence is increasing and no common ideology is to be found (Hyman, 1975; Sal-
amon, 2000; Edwards, 2005; Rose, 2008). Power and interests are being re-interpreted 
and repositioned in a more intensified and changing labor market.
The balance of power between the labor market parties can be read in the ‘output’, 
that is, the agreements, legislation, and interaction. Collective agreements must be seen 
as rigid tracks left from the safeguarding of interests and power struggles. But there are 
always new labor market situations, new trends, new struggles, and new balances of 
power—and then the regulations shift. The model thus includes a plurality of actors, 
decisions, forms of governance, and restrictions. There is talk of a hybridization of the 
forms of regulation (Hansen & Jørgensen, 2012). Double and triple regulation is central 
to understanding this phenomenon, as national and international political actors are 
also involved. Power is relational. This mean always relative, balanced.
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The political and labor-court framework that the state and labor market parties 
have worked together to develop serve as the basis for drawing sharper distinctions 
between six essentially different forms of regulation in the labor market:
1) Agreement-based regulation. The collective bargaining agreements reached between 
employers and employees regulate the material rights and obligations involved in the 
employment relationship. This also relates to the right to industrial action applying 
to both parties. The agreements are so-called ‘area agreements’; that is, they apply 
to everyone working within a given area—unaffected by their trade union affiliation 
(Ibsen & Jørgensen, 1979). The decentralization that has taken place in the Danish 
private sector in recent years has also made a difference in terms of which matters 
or areas are regulated via sector agreements or which ones require more specific 
agreements on the decentral/local level. Tied to this are the association-specific and 
local agreements (Due & Madsen, 2008). Decentral agents have thus become more 
important in the system—particularly in the private sector. In the past, the main 
organizations played a greater and more decisive role. The agreement model plays 
closely together with the next regulatory model.
2) Cooperative regulation. This model for interaction is set in collective agreements 
but characterized by a local employer–employee partnership aimed at getting the 
everyday routine in the organization to function productively. Here, there is talk of 
‘good intentions’ regulation, as there is no affiliated industrial action. This means 
that if employers qua their managerial authority say ‘no’, then the employee-side has 
no opportunity to (legally) apply sanctions. The key words in this form of regulation 
are therefore shared influence and participation by voluntary means (Caraker et al., 
2014). However, the union representatives are able to make an impact on person-
nel policy, work environment measures, the climate for cooperation, and so forth in 
binding joint resolutions (participation) (Baadsgaard & Jørgensen, 2014). 
3) Legal regulation. This form of regulation is characterized by a set of rules determined 
by the state, which are to be followed by virtue of the state’s monopoly on legisla-
tion. Here, behavior is standardized directly. Multiple forms of regulation are pos-
sible, which cover situations with legislation that can be waived (dispositive), if an 
agreement exists (semidispositive) or if such an agreement is ruled out (mandatory). 
Legislation can regulate all or parts of the labor market, including vacation time, 
maternity and paternity leave, as opposed to other areas that only apply to a specific 
group in the labor market, such as salaried employee´s legislation and the Seaman’s 
Act. Regulation, means of economic control, information, and public arrangements 
are among the management methods. As such, the authorities are also responsible 
for ensuring that the laws are complied with. The social partners have a penchant for 
legislation that may be waived if an agreement exists, which has become particularly 
relevant in the case of international regulation (particularly EU-regulation).
4) International legal regulation. As already mentioned in the Introduction, this form 
of regulation has become of increasing importance. This happens as international 
organizations such as the EU, UN, ILO, and the European Court of Human Rights 
have developed and expanded their provisions. This takes place in the form of EU 
legislation (regulations and directives), rulings from the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), and so forth. This form of EU regulation is possibly posing the greatest chal-
lenge to the Danish (and Swedish) regulatory tradition, not only because it affects all 
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employees but also because regulation preferably builds on constitutional traditions 
regarding politics and the courts as opposed to parliamentary traditions as we know 
them from the Scandinavian context. This means that the ECJ assumes an activist 
role in relation to the Danish labor market, as their ‘case law’ regulation is indis-
pensable. EU law is over national law and collective agreements, and ECJ rulings 
have placed numerous restrictions on industrial action in recent years, especially the 
Laval-, Viking-, Rüffert-, and Luxembourg cases (Kristiansen, 2013).
5) Individual contract regulation. When employment relations are not regulated by 
a collective agreement, individual contracts can be reached between employer and 
employee. Here, the custom is to reach agreement on employment, wages, working 
conditions, dismissal procedures, and the conditions for carrying out the work. This 
form of regulation has increased dramatically in recent years, especially with respect 
to white-collar employees in the private sector (Scheuer & Hansen, 2011). This form 
of regulation is preferred by many ideologically alternative trade unions (hereafter 
simply referred to as ‘alternatives’).
6) The exercise of managerial authority. In any employment relationship, the employer 
generally has the unilateral right to lay down the rules within the framework of man-
agerial authority. The powers of instruction are extensive. In Denmark, the manage-
rial authority of the employer has been established in §4 of the so-called September 
Settlement (Septemberforliget)—the first ever general agreement in the world. This is 
based on the manager3ial authority, and if regulation has not been reached by other 
means, then the employer’s instructions hold sway in terms of their right to manage 
and distribute work, to hire and fire, and to issue workplace regulations. This also 
creates advantages in interpretations in labor cases. All employees are thus covered 
by this form of management to some extent or another. In other words, it is basic. 
These forms of regulation are specifically included in different constellations in Danish 
labor market regulation. The regulatory forms and the institutions supporting them 
complement one another; that is, they work together to produce certain and changing 
results. As such, there are no individual elements or fixed structures that produce the 
results but rather the manner in which the regulations have historically played together 
in constellations of power and regulations. The sum is more than the parts, but the parts 
are not fixed. However, the ‘particularly Danish’ consists of clear emphasis on agree-
ment- and cooperation-based regulation compared with other countries (Lind et al., 
2004). Here, the partners’ preferences are unambiguous. Even though the employers 
have pressed for decentralization—particularly of wage formation—the technical and 
professional associations in Denmark have largely maintained and been able to maintain 
their right to make collective agreements in the process (Thelen, 2014).
As mentioned above, the balance between regulatory measures depends on a num-
ber of factors, including new labor market situations, cross-border movements of capital 
and labor, new trends, new struggles, and new power constellations. Such measures thus 
exist parallel to one another and in mutual hybrid connections. A number of differ-
ent factors affect the relationship between the regulatory schemes, including fluctuating 
economic conditions, increased European integration, and the capacities of the social 
partners (Caraker et al., 2015a). 
The economic and financial crisis since 2008 affected the balance of power between 
the social partners. It became a buyer’s market, where many employees accepted cuts to 
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their real wages if that was necessary to save their jobs, thinking that a smaller pay check 
beats none at all. Since 2008, the crisis has provided the inescapable backdrop that could 
clearly be read in the content in the agreements that have been reached (Caraker et al., 
2015). Parallel to the economic cycles, other factors are also in play. Social dumping 
has received extensive media attention in recent years and genuinely concerns many 
employees, as documented by our APL III study (Caraker et al., 2014, 2015). However, 
macro factors such as the economic crisis and social dumping do not automatically lead 
to changes in labor market regulations (Coleman, 1986). The conditions are translated 
to experiences and attitudes among the stakeholders, not least including businesses and 
employees. Their perceptions, interests, desires, and requirements can help create change 
or ensure continuity. There is no determinism hanging in the balance.
It is therefore particularly interesting and relevant to ask employees what they 
think about the regulation of the labor market in addition to investigating the actual 
spreading of collective agreements in relation to other forms of regulation. The empirical 
analysis therefore investigates employee attitudes to 1) the collective agreement system, 
2) individual agreements, 3) EU directives, 4) the generalization of agreements, and 5) 
government-set minimum wage. Before we consider the employee attitudes to regulatory 
reforms, we must first examine how the primary regulatory measure—that is, agreement 
coverage—has developed from 2002 to 2014. 
As mentioned above, we concentrate our analysis on trade union affiliation divided 
by peak organizations. Traditionally, the Danish labor movement has been characterized 
by trade unions and professional organization organized and defined by trade (i.e., by 
type of training or education or by employment area) with relatively clear demarcation 
lines between them (cf. Scheuer, 1998); school teachers in The Danish Union of Teachers, 
electricians in The Danish Union of Electricians, etc (Ibsen et al., 2013). Thus, the exter-
nal structure of the Danish can described as craft and to some degree general unionism 
(Clegg, 1976). These trade unions and professional organizations are for the most part 
members of one of the four peak organizations: 
•    LO (the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions): 17 member organizations represent-
ing around 843,000 workers. Organizing trade unions for skilled and unskilled work-
ers, both blue color and white color, employed in both the public and private sector. 
•    FTF (the Confederation of Professionals in Denmark): 70 member organizations 
representing around 344,000 wage earners. Mainly public sector trade unions and 
professional organizations
•    AC (the Danish Confederation of Professional Associations): 28 member organiza-
tions representing round 209,000 wage earners. Academic associations organizing 
members in both the private and public sector. 
•    Managers [Lederne] (The Danish Association of Managers and Executives): 1 orga-
nization presenting around 100,000 members (managers) in both the public—but 
mainly the private sector.
Some trade unions and professional are for some reason or the other not member of 
a peak organization but still conduct collective bargaining, for example, The Danish 
Union of Journalists. Around 60,000 wage earners are represented by trade unions with 
no peak organization affiliation. 
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In addition to the ‘traditional’ labor movement described above, a number of so-
called yellow or alternative unions exist in Denmark. The alternative unions are inter-
disciplinary organizing members across the board, that is, across different trades and 
professions in both the public and the private sectors. But the main feature that distin-
guishes the alternative unions from the traditional unions is their lack of use of collective 
action. The alternative unions do not engage themselves in collective bargaining activi-
ties with the employer side nor are they in favor of the use of strikes or any other collec-
tive actions, in fact, the statute-book of the Christian Union, the biggest alternative trade 
union, explicitly its members to strike (Høgedahl, 2014a). The alternative trade unions 
have around 250,000 members (for more on the rise of the alternative unionism in Den-
mark please see Ibsen et al., 2013; Høgedahl, 2014b). From 2002 to 2014, Denmark has 
seen a rise in the number of unorganized wage earners from around 750,000 to 810,000 
(Høgedahl, 2014a). In combination with the rise of alternative unions, we might expect 
a lower collective bargaining coverage since there are fewer members of the traditional 
trade unions in 2014 and consequently fewer and weaker power resources. 
How has the collective Agreement coverage developed?
In 2014, the total collective bargaining coverage in Denmark was experienced to be 
64% (A+C)—in 2002, the figure was 65% (cf. Tab. 1). Somewhat surprisingly, the table 
table 1 Collective agreement coverage, by main areas, 2002, 2014 (%)
Are your pay and employment conditions covered by a collective agreement, an individual contract or a 





















02 14 02 14 02 14 02 14 02 14 02 14 14
LO 51 55 15 13 22 16 5 6 8 10 73 71 948
FTF 71 70 6 5 18 18 2 4 3 3 89 88 512
AC 50 48 26 20 11 16 10 12 3 3 61 64 342
Managers 13 14 56 50 23 15 9 19 0 3 36 29 116
Without PO** * 29 * 45 * 17 * 5 * 3 * 46 58
Alternatives 31 36 30 25 21 14 13 17 5 9 52 50 231
Non-members 19 33 39 25 14 10 15 15 13 17 33 43 508
total 46 49 21 18 19 15 7 9 7 9 65 64 2715
Source: APL II (2002) and APL III (2014).
*Low significance.
**Traditional trade unions but not associated to any peak organization. 
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table 2 Attitudes to labor market regulation, main areas, 2014 (% totally/partially agree)
1)  Pay and working conditions should be regulated through collective agreements made by trade unions 
and employer associations.
2)  Pay and working conditions should exclusively be agreed to between the individual employee and 
employer
3)  EU directives should be regulating pay and working conditions to a higher degree
4)  The authorities should help ensure that collective agreements are spread to nonorganized workplaces 
(generalization)
5)  The Folketing should pass legislation to establish a minimum wage that applies for the entire labor 
market
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) N
LO 81 28 8 45 51 938
FTF 89 18 7 47 49 511
AC 74 27 10 48 52 336
Managers 47 57 7 36 47 115
Without PO* 56 46 2 27 45 57
Alternatives 55 44 9 41 55 231
Nonmembers 51 47 7 36 53 478
total 72 33 8 44 51 2666
Source:  APL III (2014).
Note:  The five questions are included in the same battery. Question used: How do you think the labor market should be 
regulated? The respondents were given five response categories based on a Likert scale: Totally agree, partially agree, Do 
not agree or disagree, partially agree, totally disagree.
*Traditional trade unions but not associated with any peak organization.
thus shows that the total collective agreement coverage from 2002 until 2014 is con-
stant. In 2014, 18% of the respondents answered that they have an individual contract, 
9% have no agreement and 9% do not know what kind of an agreement they have.
There are significant differences between the main groups. This must be seen in the 
context of how the main groups are represented differently in the private and public sec-
tors. Like the managers, many of the alternatives and nonmembers are working without 
any agreement. For the managers, the percentage is 19%, and it is 17% and 15% for the 
alternatives and nonmembers, respectively. Further differentiation is found among the 
nonmembers group. Further analysis shows that collective agreement coverage decreases 
with the length of education: Only 29% of the nonmembers with a university degree 
have a collective agreement, while 64% have an individual contract or no agreement at 
all. By main area, we find great continuity from 2002 until 2014.
employee Attitudes to Labor Market regulation
Table 2 illustrates the preferences and attitudes among employees to labor market regula-
tion on the basis of the responses (% of totally/partially agree) to five questions. The first 
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question is about collective agreements. Here, there is a clearly positive balance of opinion 
in all of the main groups, apart from the leaders. The unconditional support is high in FTF 
and LO (89% and 81%, respectively), while it is rather lower among the managers (47%), 
the alternatives (55%), and nonmembers (51%). It is also in the latter three groups that 
most are opposed. It is worth noting how 55% of the alternative members actually have a 
preference for regulation through collective agreements. This stands in contrast to the alter-
native trade unions, which are decidedly against the main components in the Danish model.
The response pattern makes clear that there is broad support for the agreement regu-
lation. It also shows that the form of regulation being used would appear to be generally 
preferable—although in such a manner that many employees with individual contracts 
or no agreements (48% and 45%, respectively) are also in favor of the collective system. 
The response pattern means that there are differences from sector to sector. Larger per-
centages of the managers, alternatives, and nonmembers work with individual contracts/
no agreements; here, support for collective bargaining is correspondingly lower.
As mentioned above, an alternative means of regulation to the general collective 
model is that wages and working conditions are reached via written or unwritten individ-
ual employment contracts. There is very limited support for such agreement conditions 
(cf. Tab. 2). The individual agreements are supported by a total of 33% of the employed 
individuals, while 44% are against; in other words, a clearly negative balance of opinion.
There are major differences between the main groups. A total 57% of the manag-
ers, 47% of the nonmembers, and 44% of the alternatives support the individual model, 
while this is only the case for 18% of the FTFs and LO in an intermediate position, for 
a total of 28%.
The 33% supporting the individual model might well appear surprisingly high con-
sidering the response pattern above regarding the agreement system and when consid-
ering the unconditional wording of the question ‘should only be agreed between’ the 
individual and their employer. There are no alternative conditions that can cast light on 
the differences between the main groups. The employees with private or no agreements 
represent 43% of the total support and 51% of the ‘totally agree’ support. Main groups 
that include a relatively larger percentage of employees with individual contracts/no 
agreement therefore have higher support percentages for the individual model.
A mere 7% find that EU directives should be playing a more prominent role with 
respect to regulating the employment relationship. The balance of opinion is thus clearly 
negative. The difference between the groups is limited, with the managers being the most 
con and the nonmembers the most pro. The lengthy historical tendency among employ-
ees to link national sovereignty with social questions and union policy rights would thus 
appear to be confirmed. The majority do not attribute decisive significance to the EU direc-
tives that have improved a number of rights on individual questions or they are against the 
legalization of the EU. There would appear to be tension in relation to Danish agreement 
regulation, where increasingly strong, de facto international influence is making itself felt 
on Danish labor market regulation—a development that employee groups do not welcome.
Generalization involves possible help from the state to render collective agreements 
more widespread and respected. This provision means that it is the employer association 
and specific union organization with the dominant collective agreement on the given area 
of trade that will ‘generalize’ the agreement to prevent underbidding; they will receive 
assurances from the state that this agreement also applies to the companies operating in 
the same area that are not covered by the collective agreement. In that case, the authorities 
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help enforce the generalized provisions (as in Norway, Finland, and Iceland). Still, this is 
not introducing Erga Omnes clauses that makes a collective agreement generally binding 
within its field of application by explicitly binding all those employees and employers who 
are not members of the parties to the agreement. In Denmark, the debate about general-
ization is relatively recent and presumably has not spread throughout the common mem-
bers in the trade unions (although see Ibsen, 2011; LO, 2011; Moos, 2012), while Erga 
Omnes is well known in other European countries (Riberio, 2016). Generalization is sup-
ported by a total of 44%. The difference between the main groups is not very great. The 
predominantly strong support to generalization is therefore also present among the alter-
natives and nonmembers. The ‘against’ share would appear to be slightly greater among 
the managers (41%) and nonmembers (31%). Almost half of LO’s members (45%) are 
in favor of generalization, almost twice the number of those against (23%). This is inter-
esting in relation to the fact that the LO do not want generalization (Ibsen, 2011). The 
responses might therefore have been given on the basis of the employees’ own experiences 
and how they feel the agreement system can be rendered future-proof. Social dumping is 
motivating the support for the collective agreement system (Caraker et al., 2015).
Similarly, positive attitudes are found in the responses about the possible introduc-
tion of a state-enforced minimum wage. A total of 51% of the employees will accept 
a government-set minimum wage, while 25% total are against. These percentages are 
rather surprising when considering the high percentage simultaneously supporting the 
collective agreement system. There are no major differences between the main groups. In 
total, around half of the members in most of the main groups support a state-set mini-
mum wage, the alternatives and nonmembers mustering the largest shares (total 55% 
and 53%, respectively). The managers stand out in terms of having the highest percent-
age against (total 35%). A large percentage of LO’s members (51%) support a state-set 
minimum wage even though the central organization is against a state-set minimum 
wage. The LO sees a contradiction between a partner-regulated system and state labor 
market regulation (as this renders it impossible to use the instruments of labor law), but 
most members do not share this view.
Overall, it must be concluded that the majority of members do not see generaliza-
tion and a state-set minimum wage as being opposed to the agreement system but rather 
as possible supplements. Most union members do not have reservations towards state 
assurances or the ‘galvanization’ of the collective agreement system, nor do they distin-
guish between the means to ensure the system like the union organizations do (Ibsen, 
2013). Further analyses reveal that 53% of those supporting the agreement model also 
support generalization, while 56% of those supporting the agreement model also sup-
port a state-set minimum wage (Caraker et al., 2015).
the stability and continued Legitimacy of  
Labor Market regulation
This article has examined the development of labor market regulation in Denmark, 
including how collective agreement coverage has developed from 2002 until 2014, while 
at the same time investigating which forms of regulation employees themselves prefer.
Now, we can conclude in relation to the research questions guiding our investiga-
tion: How has the collective bargaining coverage developed from 2002 to 2014 seen 
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in relation to other forms of regulation? And how do employees perceive labor market 
regulation? Is support for collective agreements still to be found or do employees now 
prefer other forms of regulation on the labor market? 
First, we can conclude that agreement coverage in the private sector has been 
remarkable stable from 2002 until 2014. And, the public sector is still fully covered. 
There is no erosion of the Danish labor market regulation model in this respect. 
But the constancy of agreement coverage reveals that the unions that have reached 
collective agreements with the employers have managed to maintain collective agree-
ments in the private labor market despite generally falling membership figures, economic 
crises, and an increased internationalization with increased employer flexibility as a 
result. The employees who are only subjected to the market forces without collective 
agreements or individual agreements are constant from 2002 until 2014.
When it comes to attitudes to different regulatory measures in the Danish labor 
market, there is still comprehensive support for the collective agreement model. This 
is also the case for many of the members of the alternative unions and nonmembers—
despite the fact that these employees do not contribute actively to the maintenance of the 
agreement model through membership of an agreement-bearing union. We can generally 
say that there is a connection between the form of regulation to which employees are 
subjected and the form of regulation that is preferred.
We also found that many employees believe that the agreement model can be sup-
plemented with generalization mechanisms and/or a state-set minimum wage. General-
ization and the minimum wage are not viewed by the employees as an actual alternative 
to the agreement model but rather as a supplement or support in difficult times with 
social dumping mushrooming.
The Nordic countries all have strong unions and employer organizations, compre-
hensive collective bargaining coverage, but there are big differences as to the way of 
handling collective agreements after they have been made. Systematically, Finland and 
Iceland generalize their collective agreements, and Norway has followed in a number 
of branches since 2004. In Denmark and Sweden, there are no Erga Omnes clauses and 
no public support for generalizing collective agreements. Thus, social dumping calls for 
stronger professional monitoring and regulation as well as unionization campaigns in 
these two countries, and it is much more difficult to give politicians more important roles 
as to regulation than is the case in Norway (without a Ghent system of unemployment 
insurances) and the other Nordic countries. To accept a minimum wage—as happened 
in Germany as from January 1, 2015—by the side of the labor market organization 
elites is simply impossible in Denmark and Sweden. This would imply that the collective 
weapons of strike and lockout would be illegal and that politicians partially would be 
substituting the leadership of the labor market organizations as central decision-makers.
The legitimacy at the core of the Danish labor market regulation—agreement-
based, conflict partner regulation and a model for collaboration—is not threatened, not 
even weakened over time. On the contrary, the new economy and the internationalized 
conditions for reaching agreements between the organizations on the labor market have 
brought new actors and more arenas into this regulation, thereby developing the IR 
system, but they have not provided the employees with experience and assessments that 
encourage the ‘scrapping’ of elements in the labor market system. The Danish model is 
fully alive and well in the minds of the employees and in the continued adaptation of 
the agreement and collaboration model to the new surroundings. Conversely, there are 
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increasing problems with domestic political and international regulation—particularly 
EU regulation—which interferes with the claimed voluntarism in the Danish labor mar-
ket. Even the most basic practices, institutions, and ideas of industrial relations are given 
different shape and meaning across countries or groups of countries. Globalization and 
years of economic crisis do not change this. Surprisingly, our Danish case material wit-
ness no path breaking developments. Collective and voluntary labor market regulation 
and traditional conflict resolution is strongly supported by wage earners.
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Notes
1  Arbejdsliv and Politik set i et Lønmodtagerperspektiv – Working life and politics seen from 
the employee perspective.
2  The Centre for Labour Market Research, Institut for Political Science, Aalborg University, 
AAU.
3  LO (the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions), FTF (the Confederation of Professionals 
in Denmark), and AC (the Danish Confederation of Professional Associations), Lederne 
(The Danish Association of Managers and Executives). Corresponding peak organizations 
are found the other Nordic countries: Sweden LO, TCO, SACO; Norway: LO, YS, Union, 
Akademikerne; Finland: SAK, STTK, AKAVA. 
4  Please see Bild et al., 2007; Caraker et al., 2015 for more on the pretesting, validity, and 
reliability of the two surveys.
